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Ten Legal Dissonances
by Morris B. Hoffman'
The law is extraordinarily good at operationalizing our folk psychology.
Law is, indeed, common sense writ large. As we have learned more,
however, about human nature and how the brain instantiates that
nature, it is becoming equally clear that there are some fissures in this
picture, some discrete aspects of our presumed natures, that the law
consistently gets terribly wrong. In this essay, I briefly discuss ten
common and wide-ranging legal dissonances. Although I will touch on
some suggested patches, by and large, this Article is a descriptive, rather
than prescriptive, exercise.
First, some apologies about nomenclature. By using the word
"dissonance," I do not mean to suggest any analogy to what psychologists
call "cognitive dissonance." Cognitive dissonance is a well-described
phenomenon in which it appears the brain sometimes tries to reconcile
The
conflicting information by producing self-deluding beliefs.'

* State Trial Judge, Denver, Colorado. Research Fellow, Gruter Institute for Law and
Behavioral Research. Member, John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation Law and
Neuroscience Project.
The views expressed in this Article do not reflect the views of my judicial colleagues, the
MacArthur Foundation, or the Gruter Institute. This Article is based on my presentation
at a Symposium, "The Brain Sciences in the Courtroom," hosted by the Mercer University,
Walter F. George School of Law (Oct. 22, 2010). I thank Professor Theodore Y. Blumoff
and the staff of the Mercer Law Review.
1. Jack W. Brehm, PostdecisionChanges in the Desirabilityof Alternatives, 52 J. AB.
& Soc. PSYCHOL. 384, 384 (1956). One of the seminal cognitive dissonance experiments
was conducted by Jack Brehm in 1956. He asked female subjects to rate the desirability
of eight different household appliances. He then randomly picked two appliances for each
subject and invited the subject to take one of the two appliances home as a gift. He then
asked the same subjects to re-rate the same eight appliances. The appliance they chose
to take home rose dramatically in their rankings, while the rejected appliance fell
dramatically. Id. at 384-87. The cognitive dissonance explanation of these results is that
when the subject chooses one appliance over another, the very binary nature of this choice
is dissonant with the fact that the rejected appliance also has some good features. Once
we pick the better of the two, we seem to resolve the dissonance of the choice by convincing
ourselves the better was the best and the less good was the worst.
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dissonances discussed in this Article are probably more accurately called
"decision errors."' I will stick, however, with "dissonances" because the
deeper point is that they are all examples of what Owen Jones has called
"time-shifted rationality"-behaviors with which evolution has armed us
but that, because of changes in our environment, no longer serve us as
well as they once did.' For the rationalists out there who believe that
reason is God, the law is an exercise in pure reason, and we are largely
rational beings whose ordinary common sense will seldom lead us
astray,' this Article begins with three well-known examples from
psychology and probability that show our cognitive powers and common
sense are not always what they are cracked up to be.
I. COGNITIVE REFLECTION
Consider these simple story problems. Try to answer them quickly,
without resort to writing down any algebra or other notes: (1) A bat and
ball cost $1.10 together. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How
much does the ball cost? (2) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make
5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets?
(3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day the patch doubles
in size. If it takes 100 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how
long did it take for the patch to cover half of the lake?
If you answered (1) $0.10, (2) 100 minutes, or (3) anything other than
99 days, you answered incorrectly.' But do not be embarrassed, you are
in good company. In fact, in a study of undergraduates at seven

2. I would like to thank an anonymous psychologist in the audience at the Mercer Law
Review Symposium who brought this nomenclature issue to my attention. It turns out,
however, that some very interesting work by two economists-Keith Chen at Yale
University and Jane L. Risen at the University of Chicago-is challenging the orthodox
cognitive dissonance model, suggesting that the post-choice preference change shown in
Brehm-like experiments is actually an artifact of-get ready to be surprised here-the Monty
Hall Paradox, see M. Keith Chen & Jane L. Risen, How Choice Affects and Reflects
Preferences:Revisiting the Free-Choice Paradigm,99 J. Pers. & Soc. Psychol. 573 (2010),
discussed later in this Article. See infra Part II. So maybe, without even knowing it, I was
right after all to use the word "dissonance."
3. Owen D. Jones, Time-Shifted Rationalityand the Law ofLaw's Leverage:Behavioral
Economics Meets BehavioralBiology, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1141, 1172 (2001).
4. There are still a few rationalists left. In fact, except for the kinds of exceptions
discussed, I am a big believer in the power of ordinary common sense, and indeed in a kind
of moral realism informed by evolution. See, e.g., Morris B. Hoffman, The Neuroeconomic
Path of the Law, in LAW AND THE BRAIN 3 (Semir Zeki & Oliver Goodenough eds., 2006).
I have a strong faith in our ordinary cognitive powers, which makes it all the more
important to recognize those few legal areas in which our common sense so comprehensively fails us.
5. The answers are (1) $0.05, (2) 5 minutes, and (3) 99 days.
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different universities, you can see that the best any single group did-the
cohort from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)-was to
average two right and one wrongSample
MIT
Carnegie Mellon
Harvard
Michigan
Bowling Green
Michigan State

Mean score
2.18
1.51
1.43
1.18
0.87
0.79

Toledo

0.576

On the other hand, if you got two or even all three right, do not gloat
too much. You probably sensed that they were trick questions and
intentionally resisted your first impulsive answer. Indeed, these kinds
of questions, called cognitive reflection tests (CRTs), are used by
researchers to study just that-the extent to which we can and cannot
resist our first impulse about what appears to be a purely logical task,
and what exactly it means to have such an "impulse" and to be able to
"resist" it. It turns out that just knowing these are tricky questions
arms most of us with an ability to avoid their pitfalls. In fact, when
CRT studies are conducted, the tricky questions are typically embedded
in a much larger number of non-tricky questions precisely to avoid this
powerful arming phenomenon.
Psychologists have long known, and long been delighted, that there are
many kinds of tasks at which humans are surprisingly bad, from CRTs
to a myriad of well-known visual and language tests. These sorts of
dissonances not only vary in kind, they vary in magnitude-what we
might also call "stickiness." It seems that we can avoid some dissonances just by knowing about them ahead of time, like the CRTs. We cannot
seem to shake other dissonance, no matter how long we cogitate about

6. Shane Frederick, Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 25,
29 tbl. 1 (2005). Chris Guthrie and his colleagues repeated Frederick's experiment with
Florida trial judges, who performed somewhere between Harvard University and
University of Michigan undergraduates. Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How
Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 13-14 (2007). These same authors have
written a wonderful survey of decision-making errors, both in theory and in practice,
specifically targeting the decisions of judges. See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial
Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 777 (2001).
7. Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench, supra note 6, at 10-12.
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them.' Most of these difficult-to-overcome dissonances, at least the ones
most salient for the law, are probability dissonances: problems we all
have in evaluating risk, even-and, it seems, most especially-the most
mathematically gifted of us.?
II.

THE MONTY HALL PARADOX

The most famous of the probability errors, and no doubt one of the
stickiest, is called the Monty Hall Paradox, named after the host of the
old game show, "Let's Make a Deal." At the end of each show, Monty
would give the day's big winner one last chance to win a really big prize.
He would display three doors. Behind two of them were dud prizes-for
our purposes, let us say the dud prizes were goats. But behind one of
the doors was a fantastic prize. The placement of the goats and prize
was random, but Monty knew what was behind each door before each
game began. The contestant would then pick a door-let us say she
picked Door No. 1. To tease the contestant and to increase the level of
the audience's anticipation, Monty would open one of the other two doors
to reveal a goat-let us say he opened Door No. 3.'o

8. The stickiness of a particular dissonance is probably a function of the magnitude of
its adaptive value. Perhaps the CRT-type errors are easy for us to overcome because,
although we certainly need to make quick decisions in some circumstances, our brain size
and intelligence also put an adaptive premium on taking a more measured and thoughtful
approach in other circumstances. The probability errors, which seem grounded at least in
part on the problem of hyperbolic discounting, see infra note 9, were probably driven by
much stronger adaptive pressures. Having a preference for keeping a bird in hand rather
than trading it for two in the bush would have been supremely adaptive in an era when
survival from day to day was dicey.
9. See infra Part IV.A. There are many evolutionary explanations for why humans are
generally so poor at assessing modern risks. First, the risks that mattered in the
Pleistocene-dying from cold or malnutrition, being killed by tigers or each other-have
largely been supplanted by much less direct, more complicated, risks. As Maia Szalavitz
so pithily put it, we are still more afraid of snakes than cars. Maia Szalavitz, 10 Ways We
Get the Odds Wrong, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Jan. 1, 2008, http-/www.psychologytoday.com/articles/pto-20071228-000005.html. We evolved in small groups, which arguably made us very
good at thinking about probability when the denominator is small, but not when the
denominator is large. See Paul H. Rubin, How Humans Make Political Decisions, 41
JURIMETRICS 337, 344-45 (2001). And perhaps most importantly, like most living
organisms, we are hyperbolic discounters-we greatly overvalue goods we presently own
(and current risks we face) compared to goods we might obtain (or risks we might face) in
the future. See generally George Ainslie & Nick Haslam, Hyperbolic Discounting, in
CHOICE OVER TIME 57 (George Loewenstein & Jon Elster eds., 1992).
10. There will always be such a door because either both unpicked doors have goats in
them (if the contestant's door has the prize in it) or one does (if the contestant picked a
door with a goat). Because Monty knows where the prize is, he can always pick a door
with a goat in it.
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Now this is where it gets interesting. Monty would ask the contestant
if she wanted to stick with her original pick (Door No. 1) or switch (to
Door No. 2). Here is the million dollar question: Do her odds of picking
the prize change if she switches? Most folks with even a passing
knowledge of probability say "no." After all, at the beginning of the
game the contestant had a 1 in 3 chance of picking the door with the
prize. Surely that probability could not change by switching to a door
that also, at the beginning, had a 1 in 3 probability of containing the
prize. Whether the contestant switches or not, she cannot improve her
odds above 1 in 3. An alternative explanation for why switching does
not help is that once Monty opened a door with a goat in it, two doors
were left, one of which has a goat and the other a prize. That means the
contestant's chances are now 1 in 2, but that is true whether she
switches or not. So, again, it does not matter if she switches.
It turns out, however, that both of these analyses are flatly wrong.
Switching increases the contestant's odds of getting the prize from 1 in
3 to a whopping 2 in 3! But nobody believes that result, even after it is
posited. The Monty Hall error is very sticky. In September 1990,
ParadeMagazine posed the Monty Hall Paradox to its readers, inviting
them to respond.u Out of more than 10,000 responses, only a few
correctly answered that the contestant improves-indeed, doubles-her
odds by switching.12 Among the wrong answerers were several
mathematicians who supplied defective proofs, sometimes along with
letters bemoaning the sorry state of math education in the United
States?

11. John Tierney, Behind Monty Hall's Doors: Puzzle, Debate andAnswer?, N.Y. TIMES,
July 21, 1991, http://www.nytimes.com/1991/07/21/us/behind-monty-hal-s-doors-puzzle
debate-and-answer.html.
12. Id. It is unclear what is more surprising-the Monty Hall result or that at least
10,000 people read ParadeMagazine.
13. Id. The question was actually posed by a reader of a column called "Ask Marilyn,"
written by a woman who calls herself Marilyn vos Savant, a self-reported genius whose
column delights in Mensa-style superiority celebrations. Id. To give Ms. vos Savant her
due, she correctly answered that a switch improves the odds, and it was that answer that
caused the firestorm of responses, almost all disagreeing with her. Id. The ensuing Monty
Hall debate became a bit of a cause c616bre in the mathematical and non-mathematical
communities, the former eventually acknowledging that even mathematicians are fooled
by the stickiness of this dissonance, and the latter chortling about common sense and
elitism. See id. Even Monty Hall himself joined in the fun. Id. Interestingly, he seemed
much more willing to accept the paradoxical result than the average person or even the
average mathematician. See id. Many years before the controversy, Martin Gardiner, the
mathematician-in-residence at Scientific American, posed a similar problem and lamented
"that 'in no other branch of mathematics is it so easy for experts to blunder as in
probability theory.'" Id.
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The Monty Hall result is easy to prove as a mathematical matter, but
explaining the result in words is much harder, precisely because the
dissonance it represents is so profoundly sticky in all of us. We know
the contestant improves her odds by switching, but it is hard for us to
believe it. One of the best ways to explain it is to imagine that there are
52 doors (or 52 cards). When Monty opens 50 doors to reveal goats
behind each and leaves the contestant with 2, perhaps it is easier to see
that switching to a door that Monty could have opened but did not (he
cannot open yours) is a much better play than sticking with the first
choice. Now, the switching contestant increases her odds from 1 in 52
to 51 in 52!"

The Monty Hall Paradox is just one example of a broader class of
problems that deals with changing information and conditional
probabilities, problems often grouped under the name "Bayesian
Reasoning."
III.

BAYESIAN REASONING

When all the links in a causal chain are not evident, we must resort
to probabilities to enable us to infer causation. That is, when we are not
exactly sure how, or even whether, A causes B, we need to look carefully
at how often B happens when A happens and how often A happens when
B happens. This problem is summarized by the well-worn phrase
"coincidence is not causation." But how high must the probabilities be
before we are willing to cross from coincidence to causation? And what
effect on those probabilities does additional information have (a question
particularly significant in the real worlds of science and even law, in
which information is accumulated over time)?
In some sense these are normative questions, not unlike how "sure" a
fact-finder must be before concluding that something has been proved by
a preponderance of the evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt. But it
turns out these normative questions are highly dependent on a simple,
but often overlooked, mathematical principle first articulated and proved
in the mid-1700s by Thomas Bayes, an English minister and amateur
mathematician. Known as Bayes's Theorem, it is a simple result in
probability theory," but its tendrils reach comprehensively, and

14. The surprising result of the Monty Hall Paradox depends on two conditions: (1)
Monty knows where the prize is, and (2) he opens one of the doors he knows has a goat in
it. If either of these conditions is not satisfied-that is, if Monty does not know where the
prize is or if he skips the step of showing the goat behind one of the two remaining
doors-then the contestant does not improve her odds by switching her initial pick.
15. See Ward Edwards, Conservatismin Human Information Processing,in JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 359,359-60 (D. Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
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sometimes surprisingly, into many different areas of science and law."
The Theorem's effects, and our natural resistance to them, are best
illustrated by a famous example called the Taxi Problem.
Imagine you are a plaintiffs lawyer representing a man hit from
behind by a taxi. There are only two taxi companies in this hypothetical
town-orange taxis and yellow taxis. Your client never saw the taxi, but
an independent witness tells police he is 80% sure the taxi that hit your
client was yellow. Confident that 80% is more than enough to meet your
burden of proving your civil case by a preponderance of the evidence, you
sue the yellow taxi company.
A skeptical defense lawyer decides to test the witness's reliability to
see if he was really as reliable as his self-reported 80%, and you foolishly
go along (or the judge orders the test over your objection). The defense
lawyer devises a test involving video recreations that accurately depict
the scene as the witness claims to have seen it, and that also replicate
the split-second of time that the witness had the opportunity to make his
observations. He shows the witness 10 different videos, 5 with yellow
taxis in them and 5 with orange taxis in them, the sequence of them
randomized. 7 Low and behold, of the 5 videos with yellow taxis in
them, the witness identifies 4 as yellow, matching his self-described 80%
confidence level. Likewise, of the 5 videos with orange taxis in them, the
witness correctly identifies 4 of them as orange, again an 80% success
rate. Is it time for the yellow taxi company to pull out its checkbook?
Not at all, because the real probability that the hit-and-run taxi was
yellow depends very much on the base rates of yellow and orange
taxis-that is, how many yellow taxis and orange taxis there are in the
town. At first blush, this base rate information seems beside the point.
No matter what the distribution of yellow versus orange taxis, our
witness was still demonstrably accurate 80% of the time. But actually
the base rates matter very much.

Bayes actually considered two cases, the so-called discrete case (in which we are concerned
with single probabilities) and the continuous case (in which we are concerned with
probability functions through which a given probability varies over some variable, such as
time). See id. In the discrete case, if P(A) is the probability of A, and P(B) is the non-zero
probability of B, then Bayes's Theorem states that the conditional probability of A given
B (A/B) is: P(A/B) = P(B/A) P(A)
P(B).
See id.
16. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Evidential Impact of Base Rates, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 15, at 153 (the
seminal treatment of the base rate problem as a psychological decision-error).
17. Of course, to get statistically valid results, we might have to do more than ten tests,
but I use ten illustratively.
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To see why, let us assume there are 100 taxis in the town, all of which
were out on the night in question, and that 85 are orange and 15 are
yellow. Now, let us imagine that our witness saw each of those taxis
strike the client and then reported on the taxi's color with 80% accuracy.
The table below summarizes the witness's reports:
True yellow
12
True orange
68

False yellow
17
False orange
3

Moving from the top left cell counterclockwise, the witness accurately
reports 12 yellow taxis (80% of the total of 15 yellow taxis) and 68
orange taxis (80%of the 85 orange taxis), while misreporting 17 orange
taxis as yellow (20% of 85) and 3 yellow taxis as orange (20% of 15).
When we ask what the chances are that the taxi in our actual case
was yellow, we must take into account not only the witness's 80%
accurate reports, but also his 20% false positives. Because of the
unequal distribution in the base rates in our example, the number of the
witness's false positives is actually greater than the number of his true
positives. Based on the witness's reports, the actual Bayesian probability of the taxi in question being yellow is only 41% (12 out of 29), not the
non-Bayesian 80% we might think if we paid attention only to the
witness's reliability without regard to base rates. At 41%, we would be
better off deciding this case by letting a monkey throw a dart at pictures
of yellow and orange taxis than to rely on our 80% accurate witness.
Conversely, our witness's actual ability to identify orange taxis was
increased by the asymmetry of the base rates-it rose from 80% preBayesian to a whopping 96% post-Bayesian (68 out of 71). This seems
profoundly paradoxical-an 80% accurate witness does far better if he
identifies a common event than an uncommon one. We will return to
this paradox when we discuss witness identifications and lineups.x1
The problems of base rates, conditional probability, and Bayesian
reasoning are everywhere in the law because causation is everywhere in
the law. When the plaintiff's expert testifies that he is 80% sure product
A caused plaintiff to have disease B (or the defense's expert that he is
80% sure it did not), the testimony is utterly worthless without knowing
the base rates-how many people in the general population have had this
disease caused by this product (yellow taxis) and how many have the
disease and have never been exposed to the product (orange taxis)?

18.

See infra Part IV.A.
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Depending on the ratio of those base rates, our 80% confident witness
may actually be a 41% accurate dart-throwing monkey or a 96% accurate
oracle.
I am unaware of any literature about how sticky this general Bayesian
dissonance is, but my guess is that it is somewhere between the not very
sticky CRTs and the impossibly sticky Monty Hall Paradox. Last
summer I presented these general problems to a conference of medical
malpractice lawyers and a few said that in some cases they have begun
to call statisticians to educate juries on the nuances of Bayesian
reasoning. 9 We will now see, as we finally get to my top ten legal
dissonances, the real problem with Bayesian dissonance is not necessarily that it is too sticky, but that it crops up in areas in which we often do
not even imagine there is a base-rate issue at all.

W. TEN LEGAL DISSONANCES
Here is my list, followed by some discussion divided by the category
of dissonance.
Probability Dissonances
1. Eyewitness Identification
2. Line-ups
3. Forensic "science"
4. Causation in general
In-group/Out-group Dissonances
5. Cross-racial identification
6. Peremptory challenges/Batson
Blaming Dissonances
7. Felony-murder
8. Employment-at-will
9. Moral luck
10. Severity of punishment in general

A.

ProbabilityDissonances

Every time a witness testifies in a case, it is the taxi problem all over
again. A witness may be 99% sure of something, but without some sense
of the base rates we cannot know whether the 1% error rate will swamp
the correct identifications. And, as mentioned above, our intuitions
about the effect the base rate ratios have on reliability are exactly
wrong. Most people, and therefore most judges and jurors, will give

19. I presented a version of this Article at the annual convention of the Colorado Trial
Lawyers Association in August 2010.
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much more credence to our 99% confident witness if what he identified
was an unusual event or an unusual person-for example, a one-legged
man with an eye-patch. But the uniqueness of the thing being identified
is already part of the 99% confidence level. If there are only a few onelegged, one-eyed candidates in the relevant population-for example, just
15 yellow taxis-that means almost everyone else is not one-legged and
one-eyed (85 orange taxis). That means that even a small error rate
applied to a large group will produce a large number of false positivesthat is, a large number of two-legged, two-eyed people whom our 99%
confident witness will still identify as one-legged and one-eyed.
One can imagine quite effective Bayesian cross-examination in such
a case, but only if the cross-examining lawyer can get over the dissonance that we seem to pay much more attention to the 99% confidence
level than to the base rates. In the right kind of case, perhaps even a
statistician could be used to explain Bayesian reasoning using the taxi
problem (as some civil lawyers are now doing). Conversely, if the base
rates are more evenly distributed, or even reversed, so that the high
confidence level actually translates into a small number of false
positives, prosecutors might also consider calling statisticians to talk
about the taxi problem.
Nowhere is the problem of a lack of base rate information more
apparent than in the case of identifications using line-ups, either in
person or, nowadays, the much more common photo line-up. With such
line-ups, we not only have no explicit base rate information (how many
people in the relevant population look like the defendant), but we are
suggesting to the witness that the entire base is represented by the
other photos. But of course it is not. Detectives, and even on occasion
a few appellate judges, have long recognized that in putting together an
effective line-up the challenge is to walk between two constraints: we do
not want the suspect to stick out so much that the line-up is suggestive,
but we also do not want to have the non-suspects look so much like the
Before the
suspect that there will be no hope of an identification.'
days of computer-generated line-ups, this was often a very difficult
challenge. Now it seems easy, but what is a computer really doing when

20. The jurisprudence of lineups, both in federal and state courts, has generally
followed a forgiving are. The number of comparison photographs and the extent to which
the suspect does or does not stand out from those comparisons is part of the totality of
circumstances trial judges are directed to consider. See, e.g., United States v. Rosa, 11 F.3d
315, 330 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Sanchez, 24 F.3d 1259, 1261-62 (10th Cir. 1994).
But even one-photo line-ups or in-person "show-ups," though disfavored, have passed
constitutional muster. See, e.g., Nova v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., No. 5:06-cv-61-Oc-10GRJ,
2009 WL 2242399, at *5-6 (M.D. Fla. July 24, 2009).
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it selects non-suspects with a short laundry list of similar characteristics?
The computer is constructing the illusion of a base rate. But the real
base rates may be nothing like the illusion. Good prosecutors can use
this to their advantage, and I have seen them do so: "Not only did
Witness X identify Defendant out of this photo line-up, but look at that
line-up. Look at how similar those other five people are to Defendant.
Yet Witness X unhesitatingly picked Defendant, and that's because
Witness X was there and saw Defendant." Again, however, this assumes
no great disparity in the base rates of people who generally look like the
defendant. If the defendant is very unusual looking (and therefore the
line-up with similar-looking people is quite unrepresentative), then the
identification is less reliable because the error rate will be applied to a
very large number of people who do not look anything like the defendant, generating a huge number of false positives. This is our onelegged, one-eyed example. In this kind of case, a defense lawyer might
be well served to call a statistician to testify about the paradoxes of
Bayesian reasoning.
One of the giant storm clouds gathering in criminal law is in the
traditional but unscientific area of forensic "science"-what David
Faigman calls "anecdotal forensics."2 ' These are practices that include
latent fingerprint identification, some aspects of arson investigations,
and the comparisons of tool marks, bite marks, handwriting, and nonDNA hair samples, none of which have been subjected to anything like
the rigors of the scientific method,22 instead enjoying a kind of grand-

fathering around Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.'
Although crime labs have generally been quite good about things like
inter-tester reliability, we really know very little about the confidence
levels of these techniques because the techniques have not been subject
to falsification testing. Even if we were to overcome the problem of
the reliability of the test itself, we still face enormous base rate issues.
How many sets of fingerprints in the relevant population are so similar
as to be indistinguishable by this test? How often does stippeling not

21. David L. Faigman,AnecdotalForensics,Phrenology,and OtherAbject Lessonsfrom
the History of Science, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 979 (2008).
22. Id. at 980.
23. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
24. That is, testing of the kind on which our defense lawyer in the taxi problem
insisted, when testers know whether the known and test sample are connected, use both
connected and unconnected examples, and then rate the reliability of the test. For a good
survey of the scientific failures of these forensic disciplines, see Michael J. Saks & David
L. Faigman, Failed Forensics:How Forensic Science Lost its Way, and How it Might Yet
Find It, 4 ANN. REV. L. SOC. Scl. 149 (2008).

1000

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

occur when a firearm is less than five feet from the victim? Base rates
like these are extraordinarily difficult to accumulate. Real science
spends decades and even centuries doing experiments to give some
confidence in these rates.
Causation in general, in all its myriad forms in the law, presents
profoundly difficult Bayesian issues. Every negligence case in which
cause is a genuine issue requires us to consider base rates. We may be
certain there is a 90% chance that smoking will lead to lung cancer, but
the base rates of lung cancer and smoking matter very much in deciding
whether a particular smoker died from lung cancer. Epidemiological
evidence, phrased as it often is in hidden conditional probabilities, is
especially prone to Bayesian dissonances. A headline states, "Drug X
Doubles the Chances of Disease Y" Our inclination would be to avoid
Drug X. But if the base rate of Disease Y is 0.00001, and using Drug X
increases that base rate only to a still-negligible 0.0005, then we would
not want to avoid using Drug X, especially if using Drug X reduces the
chance of having another more serious disease with a much greater base
rate.
General causation issues, and therefore Bayesian issues, rear their
heads in virtually every Daubert motion. Indeed, the Supreme Court of
the United States did us all an enormous favor in Daubert by focusing
on some of the probability issues implicit in the "reliability" of expert
testimony.25 One of those articulated factors-error rates 26-starts to
nudge up to Bayesian reasoning, but, alas, without a consideration of the
base rates to which to apply those error rates, the error rates alone
mean very little. In fact, the error rates just repeat the essential nonBayesian mistake. In our taxi example, our witness had only a 20%
error rate, but the base rates were so skewed that the error rate turned
into a real error rate of 59%. In so-called Daubert-minusjurisdictions,
like mine, in which trial courts are not commanded to consider the
Daubert factors but rather to make some gestalt determination of
2 the chance that the gate-keeper will be thinking of base
reliability,"
rates may be even less.
B. In-group/Out-groupDissonances
We evolved in small groups, and are intensely social and highly
cooperative-more highly cooperative than any genetically heterogeneous

25. See 509 U.S. at 594.
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., People v. Shreck, 22 P.3d 68, 70 (Colo. 2001).
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animal on the planet.' All this cooperation evolved to help us stay in
groups because living in groups gave us an enormous evolutionary
advantage. As a result, our cooperative impulses were sharply limited
to fellow group members, and we evolved powerful mechanisms to
distinguish in-group members (with whom we would presumptively
cooperate) from out-group members (with whom we would not only not
cooperate but often fight to the death). As civilization has expanded the
size of our groups, from clans to tribes to villages to nation-states, our
institutionally-commanded obligation to treat members of these new
artificial groups as if they were clan members has strained against our
deeply embedded impulses to distinguish in-group members from outgroup members. Racial and ethnic prejudice is a part of this tension.
Much work has been done investigating the unreliability of cross-racial
identification,' but the results of those studies may themselves be
infected with a failure of Bayesian reasoning. To see how this could be
true, let us assume our 80% accurate witness from the taxi problem is
himself orange, and that although he can reliably identify an orange taxi
with 80% accuracy, that confidence drops to 60% when asked to identify
a yellow taxi. Let us also assume the same base rates-85 orange taxis
and 15 yellow taxis.
Here is what our table looks like:
True yellow
9
True orange
68

False yellow
17
False orange
6

28. The social insects are more "cooperative," but they do not play fair. They are all
genetic brothers and sisters. Humans regularly cooperate with unrelated individuals, to
an extent unmatched in the animal kingdom. Still, our cooperation is just one side of the
evolutionary coin. On the other side is an animal built to defect from the group whenever
he thinks he can get away with it, and paradoxically, to be vigilant for defections by others
(and, mentioned below in the text on blaming dissonances, driven to punish those
defections). See infra Part IV.C.
29. See, e.g., Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cross-RacialIdentificationErrorsin CriminalCases,
69 CORNELL L. REV. 934 (1984). The cross-racial identification literature remains
controversial. Although researchers generally agree that there is some reduction in the
reliability of cross-racial identifications compared with same-race identifications, the
magnitude of that reduction remains quite unclear. Id. at 941. As the New Jersey
Supreme Court itself admitted in State v. Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457 (N.J. 1999), the first case
that held a defendant was entitled to a cross-racial identification instruction, "[a] snapshot
of the literature reveals that although many scientists agree that witnesses are better at
identifying suspects of their own race, they cannot agree on the extent to which cross-racial
impairment affects identification." Id. at 458-59, 462.
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Now, the post-Bayesian reliability of our cross-color witness is only 35%
(9 out of 21), a non-negligible drop from the 41% when our witness was
color-neutral. Perhaps more surprising, the within-color confidence also
dropped slightly, from 96% to 92% (68 out of 74), because of the increase
in false oranges.
Look at what happens, however, when we examine the same kind of
color bias, but this time in the minority's ability to identify the majority
(that is, the witness is yellow and has an 80% confidence in identifying
yellow but only a 60% confidence in identifying orange):
False yellow
True yellow
34
12
False orange
True orange
3
51
Our yellow witness's accuracy in identifying orange taxis goes down, but
the accuracy only goes down a little, from 96% to 95%. His ability,
however, to identify yellow taxis-those of his own color-shoots down
dramatically, 41% to 26% (12 out of 46).
All of this suggests that the cross-racial identification problem may be
even worse than the literature posits. More surprisingly, the data
suggests that having a cross-racial bias will also reduce a member's
ability to make accurate within-group identifications, especially if that
member is a minority. Of course, real witnesses seldom have problems
distinguishing between races (just like real witnesses seldom have
problems distinguishing between yellow and orange taxis), precisely
because of our well-formed ability to distinguish in-group members from
out-group members. The cross-racial identification literature is about
how good an orange witness is in identifying a particularorange taxi
versus a particularyellow taxi. That is, to orange witnesses, do yellow
taxis look more like each other than orange taxis look like each other,
making it harder for orange witnesses to distinguish between yellow
taxis? Still, when witnesses use myriad conscious and unconscious tags
to make gestalt identifications, the reliability of each of those tags can
be sharply affected by the base rates of those tags in exactly the manner
shown here.
Next to the question about the real magnitude of cross-racial
identification, the most important question is whether there is anything
we can do to help solve the problem without making things worse.3
That, in turn, will depend on how sticky the in-group/out-group bias is
in this identification context. The literature is not terribly clear. Like

30. See Johnson, supra note 29, at 965.
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CRTs, it seems some reduction in misidentification can be achieved by
simply telling subjects that cross-racial identification is hard.3 1 But
who knows how much traction that kind of arming strategy might give
us in the real world of witness identification. Perhaps it would help if
police and prosecutors gave all identifying witnesses an admonition,
similar to the admonition typically given before a line-up, that included
a statement like, "Studies have shown that identification across races is
less reliable than identification within a race." Whether the benefits of
this kind of solution outweigh the costs in chilling accurate cross-racial
identifications is simply not known.
More aggressively, some states allow a criminal defendant who has
been cross-racially identified to insist on an instruction warning jurors
of the problem. In 2008 the American Bar Association (ABA) passed
a resolution recommending such a procedure in all states. 3 At the
moment, however, this solution suffers from similar unknowns-will the
solution's benefits in preventing wrongful convictions outweigh its costs
in precluding rightful ones? Hopefully, the neuroscience of in-group/outgroup bias will someday be useful in answering these difficult policy
questions. In the meantime, the politics of race will likely continue to
demand action whether science justifies it or not.'
Racial bias in selecting jurors is another common problem touching on
the in-group/out-group bias. Here again, the extent to which we can
prevent this problem by adopting various arming strategies is not at all
clear. This is a problem that will probably be easier to solve than the
problem of cross-racial identification, if for no other reason than that we
have a chance to say things to jurors that we simply do not get with
identifying witnesses. As with CRTs and implicit race bias tests, maybe
just making everyone aware of the problem will help.

31. See id. at 974-75.
32. See, e.g., N.J. MODEL CRIMINAL JURY CHARGES, Non 2C Charges (2007).
33. American Bar Association, American Bar Association Policy 104D: Cross-racial
Identificaiton, 37 Sw. U. L. REV. 917, 917 (2008). New Jersey's instruction is typical:
[Y]ou may consider . . .: . . . (9) The fact that an identifying witness is not of the
same race as the perpetrator and/or defendant, and whether that fact might have
had an impact on the accuracy of the witness's original perception, and/or the
accuracy of the subsequent identification. You should consider that in ordinary
human experience, people may have greater difficulty in accurately identifying
members of a different race.
N.J. MODEL CRIMINAL JURY CHARGES, Non 2C Charges. Does the prosecution get such an
instruction when an alibi witness for the defense is a cross-racial identifier?
34. See David L. Faigman, Looking for Policy in All the Wrong Places: A Comment on
the Strategiesof "The Race and Gender Crowd" Toward Evidence Law, 28 Sw. U. L. REV.
289 (1999).
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One of the best public defenders in my courtroom, and indeed one of
the best in the whole state, was an African-American lawyer, now
retired, who regularly raised the issue of race in voir dire in a way that
seemed highly effective in arming jurors against race bias. In the
middle of what was always a consummately folksy performance, this
lawyer would say something like this, always couched as an afterthought: "Oh, I also wanted to talk about this. You may have noticed
that I'm black, and that my client's black. Believe it or not, even in this
day and age, some people might hold that against him and against me.
Anyone here with those kinds of issues?" Occasionally, a juror would
respond, we would go into chambers, and the juror would confess to
some racial bias. More often, no one would respond, but the questions
themselves may well have helped to diffuse the problem.
Another tack is to try to make sure there are minorities on the jury.
The empirical literature suggests that including a minority in a decision
group reduces the expression of racial bias, both in the deliberations and
in the outcome.35 In fact, some commentators have argued for a kind
of peremptory challenge veto to insure such representation.3 ' But there
are several problems with such a scheme. First, it plainly conflicts with
Batson v. Kentucky, 7 which has now been expanded to prohibit racial
(and other) discrimination by both prosecutors' and defense lawyers
in the exercise of peremptory challenges, regardless of the race of the
defendant or the juror.39 Second, lawyers do not want bias-free jurors.
They want jurors secretly biased in their client's favor. Criminal defense
lawyers facing slam dunk prosecutions want jurors who share their
client's minority race not because they think the presence of such jurors
will arm the group against racial bias, but because they want those
jurors to nullify. They want racial bias, but in their client's favor.
Finally, this kind of coarse racial tinkering will do exactly the opposite
of arming against racial bias-it will send the message to all jurors that
everyone is racially biased, that bias cannot be overcome, and that a
trial is not about truth but is a political event in which these representational biases must clash and fight it out in the jury room. Only a few

35. See, e.g., Deirdre Golash, Race, Fairness,and Jury Selection, 10 BEHAV. Scl. & L.
155, 170 (1992).
36. See, e.g., Deborah Ramirez, Affirmative Jury Selection:A Proposalto Advance Both
the Deliberative Ideal and Jury Diversity, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 161, 162 (1998).
37. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
38. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409 (1991).
39. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59(1992). The Supreme Court has held that the
Sixth Amendment's fair cross-section requirement does not guarantee a defendant a
representative jury, only a representative jury pool. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 478
(1990).
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political extremists actually believe that nonsense, and it is likely they
have not seen many real trials.
C. Blaming Dissonances
It is becoming clearer and clearer that humans evolved some moral
intuitions as part of the behavioral toolboxes that enabled us to evolve
as intensely social animals.' Part of those intuitions seems to be an
innate tendency to blame when we witness other humans defecting from
the group. Indeed, giant chunks of criminal law appear to reflect some
of these deeply-seated intuitions about the blameworthiness of others,
from criminal law's harm principle (generally, there is no criminal
liability when there is no harm) to its insistence on mens rea. On the
other hand, there are a handful of legal blaming rules that seem quite
dissonant with our blaming intuitions, and I will discuss four here: the
felony murder rule, employment at will, moral luck, and the severity of
punishment in general.
1. Felony Murder. In its most robust-but now almost disappeared-form, the felony-murder rule makes a co-participant in a felony
guilty of first degree murder if anyone dies during the commission of
that felony, even if the defendant did not cause the death, the death was
accidental, or if it was the defendant's co-participant who died."' Thus,
if John decides to rob a bank and in the course of the robbery accidentally discharges his gun, killing a guard, by operation of this most robust
form of the rule, John is guilty of first-degree murder every bit as much
as if he had killed the guard intentionally and with deliberation.
It turns out, however, that as an empirical matter people simply do
not hold our careless robber equally as blameworthy as our determined
killer. Work by Paul Robinson and his colleagues have even quantified
this dissonance: on a scale of 1 to 24, with 24 being the most blameworthy and 1 the least, subjects ranked our careless robber at a mean of
14.7-significantly lower than a planned ambush killing (23.3)-and not
even as high as reckless manslaughter (19.0).42
The felony-murder rule is famously dissonant, has come under
increasing scrutiny over the years, and has all but been abandoned in its

40. See, e.g., FRANS DE WAAL et al., PRIMATES AND PHILOSOPHERS: How MORALITY
EVOLVED (2006); MARc D. HAUSER, MORAL MINDS: THE NATURE OF RIGHT AND WRONG
(2007).
41. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIvE CRIMINAL LAw § 14.5 (2d ed. 2003).
42. Paul H. Robinson et al., The Disutilityof Injustice 21-25 (Scholarship at Penn. Law,
Paper No. 287, 2009), available at httpJ/sr.nellco.org/upenn~wps/287.
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most virulent form."' Still, there are states, like Colorado, where the
rule persists and has resulted in verdicts and sentences that have been
widely criticized"-in no small part because these results simply do not
coincide with our deeply held moral intuitions about blame and
responsibility."
2. Employment at Will. Like twelve other states," Colorado also
follows the employment-at-will rule, a common law doctrine under
which, in the absence of a contract, employers are free to fire their
employees for any or no reason."' There are some modern prohibited
reasons-discrimination based on race, ethnicity, or gender, and public
policy exceptions, such as whistle blowing." Other than these exceptions, however, an employer faces no liability for firing any non-contract
employee.49 When these cases are actually tried, jurors deeply resist
this doctrine. As early as voir dire, prospective jurors in these kinds of
cases often express this dissonance in a colloquy that goes something
like this:
Lawyer: We expect that at the end of the evidence in this case,
Judge Hoffman will instruct the jurors that Colorado is an employment-at-will state. That means an employer is free to fire an
employee for any or no reason. Do any of you have a problem with
that?
Jurors: [No response.]o

43. Although forty-three American states still have some form of the felony-murder
rule, in all but fifteen states the rule has been watered down to the point of non-existence,
see id. at 14 & nn.64-66, thanks in large part to the efforts of the American Law Institute,
which effectively recommended the rule's abolition in its 1980 version of the Model Penal
Code. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 6 & n.78 (Official Draft 1980). The English
abolished the rule in 1957. Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11, § 2 (Eng.).
44. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. b & n. 78.
45. See Morris B. Hoffman, Evolutionary Jurisprudence:The End of the Naturalistic
Fallacy and the Beginning of NaturalReform?, in 13 LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE: CURRENT
LEGAL IsSUES (Michael Freeman ed., forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 483) (on file with
author).
46. The twelve traditional employment-at-will states are Alabama, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Texas, and
Wyoming. HowARD 0. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS § 22.7 (2010), available at
Westlaw MODCON.
47. Id. § 22.8.
48. See, e.g., id. § 22.10.
49. See id.
50. Jurors, like regular people everywhere, will seldom voluntarily respond to a group
question that starts out "Does anyone have a problem with .. . ."
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Lawyer: Mr. Jones, what about you? Any problem with that
concept?
Juror Jones: No.
Lawyer: You could follow an instruction from Judge Hoffman
that said my client could fire this Plaintiff for any or no reason?
Juror Jones: Sure. As long as there was a good reason.
Lawyer: No, no. There doesn't have to be a reason, understand?
Juror Jones: Yes.
Lawyer: So you wouldn't hold it against my client just because
he fired the Plaintiff?
Juror Jones: Not as long as there was a good reason.
Additionally, this dissonance often plays out in the jury's findings on
pretext. I have had a few cases in which the evidence of pretext seemed
very weak-for example, when there were really good economic reasons
to fire the plaintiff, but the plaintiff argued that the real reason for the
firing was one of the prohibited reasons, and the evidence of pretext was
nothing more than the plaintiffs own supposition. In each of these cases
the jury found for the plaintiff, and I think they simply refused to accept
that an employer is free to fire employees for economic reasons.
This dissonance plays out in other ways, including our appellate
courts' own relentless chipping away at the doctrine with increasing
numbers of categorical exceptions." Perhaps we would all be better off
to abandon the rule entirely and fight the battle where the jury thinks
it is being fought anyway: did the employer have a good (and not
prohibited) reason to fire this employee?
3. Moral Luck and the Harm Principle. Legal philosophers have
The law,
long been interested in the problem they call "moral luck."
for the most part, is centered on results, and criminal law specifically is
centered on punishing harmful results. There are some exceptions-such
as attempt and conspiracy 5 -but by and large criminal law punishes
intended harm, not bad intentions that never materialized into harm.
But, of course, life is full of bad outcomes that are arguably unrelated to
the blameworthiness of the actors. The classic example is drunk driving.
Drivers A and B are equally intoxicated, have identical driving records,
are driving identical cars, and are identical in every way except one:

51. See HUNTER, supra note 46, at § 22.10.
52. See, e.g., Fiery Cushman, Crime and Punishment: Distinguishingthe Roles of
Causal and IntentionalAnalyses in Moral Judgment, 108 COGNITION 353, 354 (2008).
53. Both create their own dissonances.
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Driver A hits a tree and harms no one; Driver B kills a child. We
punish Driver B much more seriously than we punish Driver A, even
though the only difference between them is the sheer luck of harm.'
It appears the tension we all feel when the law treats these two cases
so differently may have its origins in the fact that evolution built our
brains to think about blame and punishment differently. It has long
been known, as a behavioral matter, that we blame largely in response
to our beliefs about the wrongdoer's intentionality, but that we punish
largely in response to the harm." It even appears from some fMRI
studies that different neural circuits are engaged when we blame than
when we punish.5 6 Part of the tension we feel with moral luck may be
our blaming systems telling us not to blame the drunk driver, but our
punishment systems telling us to punish him. The two systems are not
integrated.
In fact, criminal law's harm principle may be a kind of evolutionary
shortcut-what evolutionary theorists call a "heuristic"-for blame.
Natural selection is relentlessly utilitarian, and what mattered at our
emergence was whether, in a given case, the enormous costs of thirdparty punishment were justified by its deterrent benefits, both general
and special. These calculations, however, are impossible in any
particular case. We have no idea how much punishment will or will not
deter a given wrongdoer, let alone how much punishment will deter
others. Even if such calculations were possible, the calculations would
be too costly to make; therefore, evolution armed us with the ability to
make rough guesses about deterrence. Bad intentions unaccompanied
by any harm are too hard to detect, so harm became one proxy for
blame; however, because punishment is so costly and accidents do
sometimes happen, evolution armed us with a second blame
proxy-intentionality. It is when there is no intentionality-when our

54. See id. Drunk driving is also an example of another legal dissonance-strict liability
crimes. Intentionality, in some form or another, has almost always been a requirement for
criminal liability because our evolved notions of blameworthiness are determined by two
heuristics: harm and intent. See infra text accompanying notes 56-58. There is no more
difficult sentence to impose than for vehicular homicide. The difficulty likely has its origins
in the no-intention dissonance. As it has developed in modem times to address the scourge
of drunk driving, the law appears to have come to treat such cases almost as seriously as
an intentional killing, although of course they are not intentional. I will never forget the
letter I received from the eight-year old daughter of a defendant I was about to sentence
for a long prison term for killing an entire family during a drunken drive. She wrote that
it was an accident, and her daddy did not mean to hurt anyone.
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Joshua W. Buckholtz et al., The Neural Correlates of Third-Party
Punishment, 60 NEURON 930, 930 (2008); Joshua D. Greene et al., An fifRI Investigation
of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment, 293 SCIENCE 2105, 2107 (2001).
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blame intuitions depend exclusively on harm alone-that our moral luck
dissonance is at its starkest.
4. The Severity of Punishment in General. It may be tempting
to use some of these evolutionary insights to argue that current levels
of punishment in the United States are "unnatural" and should be
reformed downward. This kind of generalized punishment naturalism
is likely inaccurate as an evolutionary matter and not terribly useful as
a policy matter. Dan Kahan and his colleagues have written a critique
of punishment naturalism, arguing that we would all be better off if we
realized that our evolutionary core has largely been overshadowed by
finer cultural and policy judgments.s" Paul Robinson, Owen Jones, and
Rob Kurzban, who were the main "naturalist" targets of the Kahan
piece, have written a rebuttal." These papers make marvelous and
thought-provoking reading and are must-reads for anyone interested in
the extent to which evolved moral intuitions have any useful legal
traction. But in the end, the difference between Kahan's "realism" and
Robinson's "naturalism" is a matter of degree, not of kind. Even if
Kahan is right, however, there is no doubt that an evolutionary
perspective can still inform these larger punishment issues in two
respects.
First, as we have already seen with the felony murder rule, much of
our general sentencing severity is the product of specific legal doctrines
that can be fairly labeled "unnatural," if only in the sense that people
simply do not accept them. This is not a matter of polemics but of
empirical fact. That is, we may debate the size of the evolutionary core,
but there really is such a core, and some legal doctrines that drive
sentences higher are palpably and demonstrably outside that core. They
simply are not shared by our common grammar of blame.
There is also a second way our evolved neuroarchitectures have
created a dissonance into which generally too-severe punishment
regimens have stepped-the dissonance between blame and punishment.
The neural separateness of blame and punishment has significant
political implications. When ordinary citizens clamor for higher
punishment, they are expressing their sense of blameworthiness. When
those same citizens are asked to impose real punishments, for example,
juries in capital cases or even subjects in hypothetical experiments, their
zeal gets muted. As every prosecutor-turned-judge knows, it is one thing

57. Donald Braman et al., Some Realism About PunishmentNaturalism,77 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1531, 1532-33 (2010).
58. See Paul Robinson et al., Realism, Punishment, and Reform, 77 U. CHI. L. REV.
1611, 1611 (2010).
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to blame and quite another to be the person who actually imposes
sentences.
When citizens' un-muted and generalized zeal for blame gets
transferred to politicians, they convert it into new crimes and into
increased punishments for old ones. The one-way punishment ratchet
gets turned up a notch, and there seems to be no way out. Every time
a heinous crime is committed and news of it published in the media,
ordinary citizens, quite rightly, express their outrage-an outrage that is
an expression of blame but is converted by the legislative process into an
expression of punishment. And so the ratchet keeps turning.
I do not have any particular solutions. The stickiness of this
dissonance seems political, not neural. Maybe it would help if all
legislators were required to be trial judges for a day and actually impose
as punishments on real people the blame-driven sentences they approved
in the distant comfort of their legislative chambers. Maybe jury
sentencing is part of the answer," but even jury-imposed sentences
must lie within legislated bounds. Maybe soaring prison costs will be
their own agent of reform. Maybe this dissonance is just one of the
many prices we must pay for democracy.
V.

CONCLUSION

As we think about the law, we would be smart to remind ourselves
that our cogitations-both in the law as lawyers, judges, and jurors and
about the law as academics and policy makers-are not always perfect.
They are sometimes infected by old and persistent enemies of reason.
We are not always proficient at assessing some kinds of risk, at treating
each other fairly across group lines, or at integrating how we feel about
wrongdoers with what we actually do about them. There are many more
examples, and even categories, of such dissonances. Just recognizing
them as dissonances may help us overcome the least sticky of them.
Others will require more work and still others will require much more
work.

59. See Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 951 (2003).

